The notion of the avant-garde and even the term
avant-garde have
become at the same time popular and, for art critics like Johanna Drucker, are
somewhat embarrassing in our current cultural rhetoric. The explanation for
this ambivalent reaction lies in the importance of the avant-garde in the
history of twentieth-century art. The avant-garde movements and figures from the
futurists to the American abstract expressionist, Fluxus artists, and
Situationists seem to define the modernist impulse, while modernism itself is
the central project of twentieth-century culture. We acknowledge the modernism
and the avant-garde are not the same thing. For our purposes here, we will take
the avant-garde in the 20th century to be the leading or radical version of the
modernist project. The avant-garde shows most clearly what we are calling the
modernist problem, which in fact characterizes all the cultural
work and art of the modern period. Critics of digital literature often draw
comparisons between digital literary works and practitioners and the early
avant-garde and the neo-avant-garde of the concretists, Oulipo, and language
poetry. Such an affiliation has been explored by, e.g. [
Rettberg 2008] and [
Wardrip-Fruin 2009]. Others, such as [
Pressman 2008], have looked beyond the closest resemblances between procedural composition in digital media for literary purposes and historical forbears, to investigate instead the general “newness” of such artists as Young Hae Change Heavy Industries with references to Poundean modernist experimentation.
We can begin by distinguishing two aspects of avant-garde practice in the
twentieth century: the formal and the political. In formal terms, the
avant-garde strives for radical change in the practice of their art. In
painting, for example, the formal avant-garde could be said to begin with Manet
and the Impressionists. In writing, we could locate this disruption with
modernist writers such as James Joyce, or, with Dadaists or Italian futurists.
According to Clement Greenberg, the trend of formal opposition in painting
culminated with the (American) abstract expressionists such as Jackson Pollock,
whose work frankly acknowledged the flatness of the painted canvas. Greenberg
was an articulate spokesperson for medium-specificity in art, claiming that each
artistic medium has its own intrinsic qualities that distinguish it from all other mediums. Although he later denounced his own definition, Greenberg initially argued that “the essence of Modernism lies … in the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence”
[
Greenberg 1960]. The task of the artist is then to explore those qualities. Greenberg’s avant-garde, therefore, is formalist, revolutionizing the materials or practices of one particular art. The formalist argument is frequent in digital literary criticism as well, perhaps most prominently in Hayles’s notion of medium-specific analysis. We find the argument recently articulated in Raine Koskimaa’s essay:
All cybertextual works are in a very concrete sense
experimental writing. First of all, the authors are experimenting with the
new media, trying to find out what is possible in digital textuality, what
are the limits of literary expression in programmable media. This is a
question not so much of experimenting to break established conventions, as
of experimenting in an attempt to create new conventions. Since
the new digital technology plays such a crucial role in cybertextuality, we
may call the works in this emerging field as “technological
avant-garde.”
[Koskimaa 2010, 127]
Here, Koskimaa identifies digital technology as the medium-specific essence of
this new literature. What he calls the “technological avant-garde,” we are suggesting falls under the category of the formal avant-garde.
Other theorists, such as Peter Bürger, focus on the political dimension of the
avant-garde: its principal aim is not to define an artistic medium, but rather
to reform society itself through a new kind of art. Russian artists in the 1920s
constituted a political avant-garde (until the Soviet state turned against
them), because they wanted to contribute through their art to the re-education
of the people to the communist way of life. Bürger’s classic example of the
political avant-garde was Dada, which had no coherent program like the Russian
communists, but whose purpose was to reinvent art in the age of technoculture
(one that is not medium-specific). It was in part the horrors of World War I
that led the Dadaists to the conviction that the relationship between art and
life must change. Although called “political,” the
impulse to reform in the historical avant-garde went beyond politics in the
narrow sense to embrace a transformation of social and human relations. As Bürger puts it, “What distinguishes [the avant-garde] is the attempt to organize a new life praxis from a basis in art”
[
Bürger 1984, 49].
We are not suggesting that Bürger provided the last word on the avant-garde. Hal
Foster and others have questioned Bürger’s assertion that the avant-garde was
limited to one historical moment in the early twentieth century; they contend
that artists in the 1950s and 1960s were also avant-garde or neo-avant-garde
[
Foster 1996]. Bürger did, however, frame the subsequent debate on
whether the avant-garde was still possible. That debate has still not been put
entirely to rest, despite, or indeed because of, Johanna Drucker’s
Sweet Dreams:
Contemporary Art and Complicity
[
Drucker 2005], in which
she argues that academic art theory, which still invokes the rhetoric of the
avant-garde, is hopelessly out of date. By contrast, Jacques Rancière attempts
to recast the history of art to show how the avant-garde can be rethought as a
particular kind of attention given to the relationship between art and society.
In
The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière addresses
the question of the relationship of art and political action in the modern era
[
Rancière 2004], and for Rancière that era extends further back
– to the beginning of the 19th century, when European culture began to
understand art as a special category of human endeavor. Within this general
definition of modern aesthetics, Rancière distinguishes two kinds of political
aesthetics. One is the insistence that art has no boundaries, which leads not
only to what Bürger and others think of as the radical political avant-garde of
the Dadaists and Futurists, but also to those modernists such as the Werkbund
and the Bauhaus, who wanted to make art and design contribute to an aesthetic
reimagining for modern society. The other political aesthetics is one that
emphasizes the autonomy and separateness of art from the everyday and from the conventional notion of politics itself. For Rancière, Adorno represents this aesthetics, because Adorno asserts that art can have a political function precisely by maintaining its distance from conventional political and social engagement. This second political aesthetics is not the same as formalism, but it does seem to accommodate the kind of formalist agenda put forward by Greenberg. In fact, Rancière’s definition of the aesthetic regime is that “it strictly identifies art in the singular and frees it from any specific rule, from any hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and genres … It simultaneously established the autonomy of art and the identity of its forms with the forms that life uses to shape itself”
[
Rancière 2004, 23]. The self-identification of art with its forms would seem to be a formal effect that occurs at the level of the artist’s and audience’s engagement with the work of art. It would seem to be exactly what Picasso or Pollock do in their paintings by disrupting traditional illusionistic representation. Rancière argues that critical art (throughout the 20th century and perhaps today) should function by exploiting a tension between these two aesthetic positions: between an aesthetics that dissolves art into life and one that insists on art’s distinct and autonomous function. This call for a “third way” gives us a new perspective on the classic division between political and formal modernism, and we will return to this perspective below.
The historical avant-garde and by extension all of modern art and design have
left us with this question: what is the relationship between formal innovation
and political action? The recent work of Rancière does not settle this question,
but rather shows that it is still relevant. The modernist problem that we have
inherited is to decide whether and how art matters for our culture and society.
Is art simply a joyful engagement with forms, as Drucker seems to suggest, or
should it lead us to a new life praxis, as Bürger’s political avant-garde
insist? Does it lead to a new way of living
through formal
innovation? In this vein, Simanowski argues, building on Alan Liu’s discussion on information cool, that “formalism ... itself is a culture-critical statement (as it was a century ago with respect to classical avant-garde)”
[
Ricardo & Simanowski 2009]. The notion that radical formal innovation is itself political would be a solution to the modernist problem in one stroke, because it would bring together the two defining aspects of the avant-garde in the twentieth century. The American abstract expressionists or, say, James Joyce would become political artists.